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OVERVIEW — Medicare’s method to annually update the fees it pays phy-
sicians has been under fire for some time—specifically, since the method de-
termined that physician fees should be reduced rather than increased. The
update method, called the sustainable growth rate (SGR), was implemented
to control the growth in Medicare physician spending. Yet Congress, in re-
sponse to physician concerns about beneficiary access to care, has acted to
avert physician fee cuts since 2003. Although this signals dissatisfaction with
the SGR methodology, there is yet to be a widely accepted physician fee up-
date proposal that balances federal budgetary realities with the need to ensure
beneficiary access. And the cost of changing the update method continues to
mount, adding to the difficulties of developing a solution that meets the needs
of all stakeholders. This issue brief describes the SGR methodology, the rea-
sons why projected physician fee updates are negative, and some options that
have been proposed to remedy the current situation.
This issue brief is the second of two related papers on physician spending
and Medicare’s sustainable growth rate methodology. The companion pa-
per was published on October 9, 2006 (see Issue Brief 815, available at
www.nhpf.org/pdfs_ib/IB815_PhysicianSpending_10-09-06.pdf).
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Updating Medicare’s
Physician Fees: The Sustainable
Growth Rate Methodology
Implemented in 1998, the sustainable growth rate (SGR) methodology
was designed to annually adjust Medicare’s physician fees to bring Medi-
care physician spending in line with a spending target. Until 2002, total
physician spending was below the target, so the fees were increased an-
nually. Spending on physician services exceeded the target in 2002, how-
ever, so Medicare physician fees were reduced by 4.8 percent. Since then,
spending has continued to grow faster than the target, triggering nega-
tive SGR-determined updates. In response to concerns that lower fees
would impede beneficiary access to services, however, Congress acted to
prevent the negative updates from occurring from 2003 to 2006.
The SGR methodology continues to be the law and physician spending
continues to be above the target. As a result, Medicare physician fees
are scheduled to be reduced by about 5 percent in 2007. Although Con-
gress may avert a fee cut for 2007, without addressing the high growth
in physician spending, physician fee updates are expected to be nega-
tive through 2012. Each year that the SGR methodology remains the
law and spending growth remains high, the budget pressures increase.
The search for a way to update physician fees that balances beneficiary
access and budgetary concerns continues.1
This issue brief explains Medicare’s physician payment approach, the
SGR methodology, and the difference between actual spending and the
spending target. It discusses why the gap between the target and actual
spending continues to widen, including the effect of initial estimation
and forecasting errors and more recent escalation in the volume and
intensity of physician services. These and other technical concerns with
the SGR methodology, philosophical arguments about this update ap-
proach, and some widely discussed SGR “fixes” are also presented.
PAYING FOR PHYSICIAN SERVICES
Medicare’s physician fee schedule, designed to promote payment eq-
uity across services and physician specialties, determines payments for
over 7,000 physician services using the resource-based relative value
scale or RBRVS. The fees are the product of a relative value assigned to
each service and a conversion factor that translates the relative value
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into dollars (Table 1). The relative values are based on estimates of the
resources used to deliver each service to a typical patient compared with
the average resources required for all other physician services. Three
types of resources are accounted for: the physician’s time, effort, and
expertise, called the work component; practice expenses, that is, office
space, nurse’s time, equipment, and other expenses associated with the
office; and malpractice premiums.
The Medicare fee for an intermediate office visit, for example, was $120.14
in 2006. This is based on its relative value of 3.17 and the 2006 conversion
factor of $37.8975. The fee is the same for a particular service, regardless
of the specialty of the physician delivering the care. The fee is adjusted,
however, for geographic differences in resource costs because it is more
expensive to practice medicine in some areas than in others.
The fee schedule replaced a system in which payments were based on his-
torical physician charges in an area, subject to various limits. The former
system, generally viewed as inequitable, resulted in vastly different fees for
the same service across individual physicians, medical specialties, and geo-
graphic areas. In addition, fees for different services did not necessarily vary
according to the resources used to provide them. For example, evaluation
and management services, which include office visits, were believed by many
to be undervalued relative to procedural services such as surgeries.
Recognizing that Medicare’s physician fee schedule did not provide incen-
tives for physicians to control the volume and intensity of services, Con-
gress mandated that updates to the fees depend on achieving an overall
spending target. Linking the update to the growth in overall physician
X
TABLE 1
Medicare Physician Fees, Selected Examples, 2006
Relative Conversion
SERVICE Value Factor Fee*
Initial Inpatient Consultation 3.75 $ 142.12
Office Visit (minor problem) 1.02 38.66
Office Visit (intermediate) 3.17 120.14
Radiologic Exam
(chest – two views) 0.96 36.38
Echocardiogram Exam
(heart – complete) 5.40 204.65
* This does not reflect Medicare’s adjustment for geographic cost differences.
Source: American Medical Association (AMA), “Conversion Factor and Payment Schedule,” February
15, 2006; relative weights determined through search on AMA Web site, “CPT (Current Procedural
Terminology,” available at www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/3113.html.
=
$37.8975
for all services
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spending is a unique approach to controlling spending, reflecting the
unique role of the physician in health care delivery as well as the absence
of effective means to assess the volume and types of physician services
that are provided.2 As the gatekeeper to most medical care, physicians
prescribe and recommend not only
physician services, but other health
care services as well. Thus, they have
more control than institutional pro-
viders, such as hospitals and home
health agencies, over the quantity and
types of health care services delivered
and, ultimately, their own Medicare revenues. The target spending
concept incorporated in the SGR methodology takes the place of volume
control incentives and utilization checks that are incorporated in
Medicare’s payment approaches for institutional providers.
By linking fee updates to spending, the SGR methodology is intended to
provide physicians a collective incentive to control the volume and inten-
sity of physician services. Spending on physician services is the product of
the fee for each service; the number, or volume, of services provided; and
the mix, or intensity, of services delivered. The SGR methodology deter-
mines the annual change in the conversion factor—the piece of the equa-
tion controlled by the Medicare program—based on a comparison of prior
years’ total physician spending with a spending target. Physicians, as a
group, are rewarded by larger increases in fees when actual spending per
beneficiary, adjusted for inflation, is less than the target (Figure 1). Con-
versely, they are penalized with a lower update to fees when spending is
<If then...Spending TargetActual Physician Spending
> Spending TargetActual Physician SpendingIf then... Update < Inflation
Update > Inflation
FIGURE 1
Physician Fee Update
Source: Federal Register, vol. 70, no. 223, November 21, 2005, p. 70304.
The SGR methodology incorporates a spending
target that substitutes for volume control incen-
tives and utilization checks in Medicare’s payment
approaches for institutional providers.
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above the target. Policymakers believed that, under the SGR methodology,
physician specialty societies or other physician groups would develop prac-
tice guidelines that would influence the volume and intensity of physician
services—the other parts of the spending equation.
All of the components of determining a physician
fee—the relative values, the conversion factor, and
the geographic adjustment—have been controver-
sial, but probably none are as contentious as the
SGR methodology. In the early years of the SGR
methodology, when physician fee updates were
large and positive, this was not true. But as projected updates have be-
come negative, concerns about other components of the payment system
have taken a back seat.
CALCULATING THE UPDATE
The annual update to physician fees determined through the SGR meth-
odology involves several concepts. The starting point for the calculation
is the annual inflation in the costs of providing physician services, as
measured by the Medicare economic index (MEI). The MEI then is ad-
justed up or down to reflect how far actual Medicare spending on physi-
cian services is from the spending target. For any year, the target is the
previous year’s target, adjusted by the SGR (Figure 2). The original target
was Medicare’s physician spending in 1996, the first year that this type of
update methodology was used.
The MEI
The MEI measures the changes in the costs of the various expenses involved
in providing physician services.3 The largest expense category is physician
compensation, comprising over half of the expenses of providing physician
services. Compensation for nonphysician personnel accounts for almost 20
percent of the index. Other expense components, like professional liability
insurance and medical equipment, contribute smaller shares to the total.
FIGURE 2
Annual Physician Spending Target, 2006
2005 Target
$80.4 billion
2006 SGR
• Inflation
• Change in FFS 
Beneficiaries
• GDP
• Laws & 
Regulations
X = 2006 Target$81.7 billion
Source: Federal Register, vol. 70, no. 223, November 21, 2005, p. 70304.
All of the components of determining a
physician fee have been controversial,
but probably none are as contentious
as the SGR methodology.
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The SGR
The SGR itself is the actual amount that the
spending target is raised (or lowered) from one
year to the next. Its components represent the
factors that affect physician spending (Table
2). It is the product of the estimated change in:
■ Inflation in the costs of providing the Medi-
care services included under the target
■ The number of beneficiaries in Medicare’s
fee-for-service (FFS) program4
■ The overall economy, as measured by the
real gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita, which is intended to accommodate
increased volume
■ Medicare laws and regulations that affect
physician service utilization or spending5
The Annual MEI Adjustment Calculation
The adjustment to the MEI6 is the percentage of actual spending on physi-
cian services that is above or below the spending target on an annual and
on a cumulative basis. For example, the 2006 spending target was $81.7
billion and actual spending was $97.4 billion (Figure 3). The difference be-
tween cumulative spending (since 1996) and the cumulative target was
$47.4 billion. This cumulative comparison is incorporated in the MEI ad-
justment because the update, by statute, cannot be more than 7 percentage
FIGURE 3
Calculating the Adjustment to the MEI
* Adjustment is limited to a range of –7 percentage points to +3 percentage points. The calculated adjustment falls below the bottom end of the negative
range, so the 2007 MEI adjustment is –7 percentage points.
Source: Herb B. Kuhn, CMS, letter to Glenn M. Hackbarth, MedPAC, April 7, 2006.
0.75 Cumulative Target  –  Cumulative Actual
Actual Spending   X   SGR
0.33Target  –  Actual
Actual
$97.4 billion
$693.6 billion   –   $741.0 billion
MEI 
Adjustment
$97.4 billion   X   1.007
$81.7 billion  –  $97.4 billion
2007 MEI Adjustment
0.75 0.33 –28.0%*
TABLE 2
Components of the SGR, 2004 to 2007
SGR TOTAL 6.6% 4.6% 1.7% 0.7%
COMPONENTS, Change in:   2004  2005 2006  2007
Inflation 1.3 0.8 2.7 2.6
FFS Beneficiaries 1.3 0.3 -3.1 -2.9
Real Per Capita GDP 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2
Laws & Regulations 1.7 1.2 0.0 -1.0
Source: Federal Register, vol. 70, no. 223, November 21, 2005, p. 70309;
and Herb B. Kuhn, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), letter
to Glenn M. Hackbarth, Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC),
April 7, 2006; available at www.cms.hhs.gov/SustainableGRatesConFact/
Downloads/MedPAC_Letter_Estimated_2007.pdf.
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points below the MEI or more than 3 percentage points above the MEI in a
single year. Any residual difference between actual and target spending
from previous years will be “picked up” through the cumulative part of
the formula. As a result, the further the actual spending is from the target,
the longer it could take to bring spending in line with the target.
WHY IS THE UPDATE NEGATIVE?
At least through 2012, payment updates under the SGR mechanism are
projected to be negative. This is because actual spending has been higher
than the annual target for several years, beginning in 2002. That year,
fees were reduced by 4.8 percent. The updates in subsequent years also
would have been negative except for congressional actions that allowed
a positive or zero update percentage for 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006.7
The discrepancy between actual and target spend-
ing has continued to grow for two reasons. First,
when it suspended the updates, Congress did not
modify the calculation of the target at the same time.
This means that the difference between what the
fees were between 2004 and 2006 and what they
would have been had the SGR-determined update
been used has been added to cumulative spend-
ing, but not to the target. For example, in 2005,
spending was $14 billion more than the target,
which contributed to the cumulative difference of
$30 billion.8 Because the cumulative comparison is
specified in statute and thus constitutes current law,
the discrepancy between actual fees and what they
would have been had the SGR-determined update
been applied, needs to be repaid through lower
physician fee updates.
Second, the volume and intensity of physician ser-
vices has been rising faster than GDP, pushing spend-
ing further above the target (Figure 4).9 For example,
for 2005, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Ser-
vices (CMS) estimated that growth in the volume
and intensity of physician services increased physi-
cian spending by 7.5 percent.10 In the same year, the
GDP—which is the component of the SGR to account for increased volume
of services—was 2.3 percent. Physician spending grew 5.2 percentage points
faster than GDP, which is spending growth not accounted for in the target.
WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?
Four years of congressional overrides of the updates determined through
the SGR methodology are evidence enough that something is broken and
*Ten-year moving average GDP per capita.
Source: Herb B. Kuhn, CMS, letter to Glenn M. Hackbarth, MedPAC,
April 7, 2006.
FIGURE 4
Annual Increase in the Volume and Intensity of
Physician Services, Compared to Growth in
the Economy, 1998 to 2005
Volume & Intensity
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Growth in Economy*
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needs to be fixed. The congressional actions are primarily in response to
concerns about physician fees increasing at less than the costs of providing
services and the potential impact of this on access to care for Medicare
beneficiaries. The American Medical Association (AMA) testified before
the U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on Ways and Means that,
“Physicians simply cannot absorb these draconian payment cuts and, un-
less Congress act(s), it is difficult to see how they can avoid discontinuing
or limiting the provision of services to Medicare patients.”11 However, evi-
dence to date does not indicate any change in beneficiary access due to
lower fees. During 2002, when fees actually were cut, the volume and in-
tensity of physician services rose, and they have continued to rise since
then.12 Even so, MedPAC and GAO agree with the Congressional Budget
Office, which believes beneficiary access “may change if payment rates are
significantly reduced, as will occur if the SGR mechanism operates as cur-
rently specified in law.”13
In addition to failing to update fees to keep up with inflation, the SGR meth-
odology has been faulted for inequity. The update applies to all physician
services, affecting the payments to all physicians treating Medicare patients.
Yet, increases in physician spending have not been equal. The growth in the
volume and intensity of imaging services, for example, has contributed a
disproportionate amount to overall physician spending.14 Widely noted geo-
graphic differences in the use of services15 suggests that either volume and
intensity of services should increase more in areas with lower use patterns,
or that spending should be constrained in areas with higher use, or both.
Further, technological developments that would boost service use are likely
to apply to some services more than others, yet all volume and intensity
growth is treated the same under the SGR methodology.
A related concern is that the methodology may be ineffective. The belief
that linking physician fee updates and a budgetary target could contain
physician spending has been called into question. According to MedPAC,
the SGR approach is flawed because “it was assumed that the system
would provide physicians with a collective incentive to control the vol-
ume of services. This goal is unrealistic, however, because an individual
physician reducing volume in response to incentives provided by the
SGR system would not realize a proportional increase in payments…. If
anything, an individual physician has an incentive to increase volume
under such a system.”16
FIXING THE SGR METHODOLOGY
Clearly, the choice of a “fix” to the SGR methodology depends on the
component of the SGR problem that is of most concern and the emphasis
on the budgetary consequences of any fix. The SGR methodology could
be changed to reduce the difference between actual spending and the
target (thus reducing the chances of a negative update) or to provide dif-
ferential updates to reward or penalize certain actions. Reducing the
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actual and target spending differentials would, by definition, result in
higher physician spending, which may address beneficiary access con-
cerns. Differential updates could also result in higher physician spend-
ing, but not necessarily. Some believe that differential updates could
improve the equity of the update and the effectiveness of incentives
provided through the update in changing physician behavior.
Loosening the Spending Target
There are several ways to reduce the difference between actual spending
and the target that would keep the basic the SGR methodology intact.
The spending target could be raised by changing its calculation. Alterna-
tively, spending could be lowered by modifying the definition of spend-
ing that is compared to the target. Another option would be to “buy down”
or eliminate the residual, cumulative difference between the target and
actual spending that had not been addressed through reduced updates.
These changes would raise Medicare physician spending and affect ben-
eficiaries through higher premiums and co-payments, as well as put pres-
sure on the federal budget.
The gap between actual spending and the tar-
get could be reduced (which would lead to
higher fee updates) by substituting a different
measure of “allowable” cost increases associ-
ated with technological advances. As stated,
GDP is used as a benchmark to increase the tar-
get for additional spending. The rationale for this is that as the economy
grows, so does the ability to apply more resources to health care spend-
ing.17 The need for health care, however, does not increase proportionately
with growth in the economy. In some cases health care services may be so
desirable that society would want to expend additional resources. For ex-
ample, increases in primary care or preventive services may be expendi-
tures that society would value. Given rapid technological growth and evi-
dence that the Medicare population may be in need of additional services
to treat multiple, chronic conditions, a more realistic benchmark may be
higher than the GDP. Determining another metric for growth in spending
beyond population and inflation that would be more appropriate than GDP,
however, would be subject to controversy and disagreement.
The definitions of spending used in the target and the actual amount of
spending under the SGR methodology could be modified. Currently, more
services are included in the SGR definitions than those actually paid un-
der the physician fee schedule.18 Spending associated with services and
supplies “incident to” a physician office visit and related to physician fee
schedule services are included in the definition because physicians are
responsible for ordering and often performing these services. Physicians
may financially benefit from providing these services, so they are included
under the target to provide incentives for physicians to control their
Increasing physician fees would not only
raise Medicare spending but also benefi-
ciary spending through higher co-payments
and premiums.
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volume and intensity.19 Removing physician-administered drug costs from
the calculation of actual spending and the target was proposed when
spending for these drugs was climbing faster than spending for other
physician services.20 The reason for this proposal was that, although phy-
sicians ordered and administered the drugs, they had to purchase the
drugs and did not control their price.21 However, physicians do have con-
trol over the volume and type of drug used, which does affect overall
spending. 22 Spending for physician-administered drugs has since fallen,
therefore removing these services has not been specifically suggested be-
cause their removal would not narrow the gap between actual and target
spending, but would instead widen it.
Physician fee updates are projected to be negative through 2015, in part,
because of the spending that accumulated while the SGR-determined
updates were suspended. The cumulative target could be rebased, or cal-
culated from a more recent start point, to reduce or eliminate the effect of
unrecovered spending. This, however, would have a budgetary impact
because the budgeting rules assume that the spending above the target
will be recovered through lower updates. The cost or savings associated
with any changes are measured relative to this assumption. Therefore,
reducing or eliminating the residual spending that has not been recov-
ered would be counted as a cost for federal budgeting purposes. In this
way, changes to the cumulative component of the formula could add sig-
nificantly to budgetary concerns.
Any of these “fixes” also would have real budgetary implications for the
Medicare program and its beneficiaries because they would raise Medi-
care spending. These increases would, in turn, directly affect beneficiary
out-of-pocket costs through higher beneficiary co-payments and premi-
ums, which are calculated as a share of fees and spending, respectively. Co-
payments for most physician services are 20 percent of the Medicare fee, so
any fee increases raise beneficiary obligations. As an illustration of the pos-
sible effect on premiums, CMS estimates that the Medicare premium will
rise 1.5 percent to $95 per month if 2007 physician fees are held to 2006
levels, rather than subject to the SGR-determined cut.23
Targeting the Target
Some argue that the effectiveness and equity of the SGR methodology could
be improved by implementing separate targets for different segments of
physician spending. This could strengthen the relationship between any
given physician’s actions and subsequent fee updates. Individual physi-
cians would have more of an effect on the volume and intensity of services
that would contribute to meeting the spending target. This approach is
likely to receive serious attention because MedPAC is required to evalu-
ate separate targets in its congressionally mandated report on alterna-
tives to the SGR.24 Specifically, the Commission must consider separate
spending targets that would apply to physicians in group practices,
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 hospital medical staffs, types of service, geographic areas, and physician
outliers (meaning physicians with spending or practice patterns that are
very different from those of otherwise similar physicians).
Segmenting physician spending to apply separate targets could achieve
multiple policy objectives. Regional targets, for example, could be a tool
for reducing geographic disparities in health care utilization. Tighter
spending targets could be applied to regions that have higher-than-
average physician spending to give physicians stronger incentives to
either slow growth in spending, or reduce service use to bring patterns
in line with the overall average. At
the same time, looser targets in
underserved areas could be a means
to provide greater access.
Categories of services could also be
subject to different spending targets.
Services that exhibit particularly high
rates of growth, such as imaging services for example, could be singled
out for tighter spending targets and lower updates. Alternatively, the use
of additional preventive services, for example, could be encouraged
through looser targets and higher updates. A variant of this option would
be to aggregate spending by physician specialty, which could be used to
bolster certain medical specialties. Primary care physicians, for example,
could receive higher updates for the services they provide than special-
ists to address what many perceive as payments that are too low to en-
courage enough physicians to enter primary care.
To encourage physicians to manage services for a given population, sepa-
rate targets could be applied to spending associated with organized groups
of physicians. For example, physicians in a multi-specialty group prac-
tice could be subject to a spending target with higher updates if their
combined spending was lower than what was expected from a similarly
situated group. Group practices would then be rewarded for adopting
efficient patterns of care across the range of services they offered. Most
physicians, however, are not part of a multi-specialty group. Another
option would be to aggregate the spending associated with all physicians
affiliated with a particular hospital for the purpose of applying a spend-
ing target. This might support physician efforts to strengthen affiliations
in an effort to manage spending within their control.
Any of these options could reinforce the link between the individual
physician’s actions and financial reward or penalty through the Medi-
care update mechanism. The strength of the relationship between indi-
vidual actions and the incentives would be directly proportional to the
size of the spending segment. An individual physician’s control over the
financial reward or penalty would be greater when the services provided
by that physician comprised a larger proportion of the total spending
associated with the target.
Separate spending targets could strengthen the
relationship between an individual physician’s
actions and financial rewards or penalties through
Medicare’s fees.
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Implementation — Implementing separate spending targets with differ-
ent associated updates would require overcoming several technical issues.
Allocating spending to the appropriate target is subject to error, and these
estimates become less precise as the number of spending targets grows.
Yet, the smaller the spending target, the more any inaccuracy in assigning
spending would affect the relationship between actual and targeted spend-
ing. The smaller the target, the greater the need to account for variations in
health care needs through a risk adjustment mechanism. Because health
care costs in a small spending segment would be concentrated in a rela-
tively small number of beneficiaries, the presence of relatively few benefi-
ciaries with high costs could skew the spending subject to the target. In this
scenario, spending could be above the target if the comparisons did not
adequately account for differences in risk across different populations.
Another set of difficult implementation issues associated with defining
the segments of spending and then assigning separate targets is political.
As more and more lines are drawn that affect fees and fee increases, the
more disagreement there will likely be with respect to which spending
belongs where. This kind of segmentation would require more explicit
decisions about which spending is more desirable than other spending.
The Medicare program is not supposed to affect clinical decision making,
yet decisions about differential updates could be perceived as decisions
that would directly affect the practice of medicine.
Relative Fees — Aside from these implementation issues, segmented tar-
gets would change the structure of the physician fee schedule over time.
The physician fees were developed to reflect the resource use of each ser-
vice relative to the overall average. With the application of different up-
dates—regardless of the way the spending was segmented—the relative
comparisons across the fees would be changed. This would affect an un-
derlying tenet of the payment system that the fee for a service be the
same across providers. Over time, fees might no longer be the same for
the same service, nor would they necessarily differ according to the re-
sources needed to provide each service. This might be an acceptable
change to the structure of the fee schedule if the resultant fees more accu-
rately represented the value of services to society. How this would be
assessed, however, would be difficult.
SCRAP THE WHOLE THING?
Because of the payment cut in 2002 and projected cuts through 2015, the
AMA urges Congress to “repeal the SGR and replace it with a system that
keeps pace with increases in medical practice costs.”25 MedPAC also has
advocated eliminating the SGR and bases its annual update recommenda-
tion on assessments of payment adequacy and how efficient providers’ costs
are likely to change in the coming year. In recognition of the effect of Medi-
care physician spending on the federal budget, the Commission acknowl-
edges that Congress may need to keep some form of volume control in
determining the final update to physician fees.26
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Rather than relying on the SGR methodology, which treats all physicians
and services alike, MedPAC proposed focused policy approaches to limit
inappropriate volume increases.27 For example, after it identified imag-
ing services as one of the fastest growing among physician services, the
Commission analyzed spending for imaging and the physicians who pro-
vided the services. Based on this analysis, MedPAC developed a set of
recommendations to Congress to reduce inappro-
priate use and improve the quality of imaging ser-
vices. These recommendations included expanded
ability to identify improper claims, reduced pay-
ments for services requiring fewer resources,
payment to certified providers only, and expanded
restrictions on physician self-referral.
This type of approach to controlling spending on particular types of ser-
vices could also be applied in various geographic areas or used to identify
specialties if analysis indicated that special circumstances contributed to
utilization that was believed to be unwarranted. This would subject spend-
ing control decisions to greater transparency than the automatic SGR-based
updates, which are applied across all services. The data and resources to
conduct such analyses, however, would need to be available.
BUT CAN WE LIVE WITHOUT IT?
Before the SGR methodology and its predecessor, Medicare experienced
multiple years of double-digit physician spending increases due prima-
rily to growth in the volume and intensity of physician services, not
changes in fees. The targets and subsequent feedback through the update
were intended to provide incentives to control the volume and intensity
of physician services. It is not possible to determine the extent to which
this incentive had an impact on physicians in the aggregate. There were
few, if any, reports of instances in which physician prescribing and order-
ing behavior changed because of fee updates, although spending growth
did moderate after implementation of the initial version of the targets.
The physician spending update approach is the only one in which Medi-
care links annual updates to a spending target, but other Medicare pay-
ment systems include checks on or incentives for providers to control
volume and intensity growth. Payments for most facility services [such
as acute care hospitals, skilled nursing facilities (SNFs), and home health
agencies] bundle the payment to cover all services provided during a speci-
fied period of time (for example, the hospital stay, a day, a 60-day episode).
In this way, the provider has financial incentives to control the volume of
services delivered during the period covered by the payment. In addition,
most other Medicare payments are predicated on a physician determining
that the service was needed, which provides a check on rising volume.
Moreover, beneficiaries may be hesitant to enter a hospital or a SNF
unless they feel there is no other choice; this reluctance constrains
Targeted approaches to controlling in-
appropriate volume increases would be
more transparent than the automatic
SGR methodology.
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service use. Beneficiaries may be less resistant to returning for addi-
tional office visits or having more tests or imaging services provided in
a physician’s office to definitively confirm or rule out a diagnosis. Re-
gardless of the monetary cost of any particular service, the time and
emotional costs of admission to treatment in a facility are likely higher
than the costs associated with some of the physician services that have
witnessed the greatest growth.
CONCLUSION
Few would wholeheartedly endorse the current SGR method for updat-
ing physician payments. This methodology has resulted in updates that
do not keep up with inflation in the cost of providing services, and it
may not provide the collective incentives to moderate the rising vol-
ume and intensity of physician services as in-
tended. Some have even argued that it has the
opposite effect—that its fee reductions have
actually caused the volume of services to go
up as physicians seek to maintain their income.
Yet the fiscal pressures on the Medicare pro-
gram are real. The challenge of accommodat-
ing increased Medicare spending on physician services will only inten-
sify as the population ages and has greater health care needs and as new
technology expands effective treatments. Spending control mechanisms
may be more effective for other Medicare services than for physician ser-
vices, which could contribute to an escalating share of health care spend-
ing on physician services. Maintaining the appropriate balance of resources
across the components of health care may ultimately result in the most
efficient Medicare spending, but determining and achieving this balance
will be difficult.
Congressional and policy discussions about how to control physician
spending have focused on ways to ensure that Medicare spending is for
appropriate services that help its beneficiaries. It is widely accepted that
Medicare should pay reasonably for services that are valued. Doing this
would require more detailed and timely data on the resources required
to provide each service and information on the value of particular ser-
vices to different populations. More systematic and targeted approaches
to reducing unnecessary service growth require more specific informa-
tion about what services are actually provided and the value of those
services. Developing this information and ensuring its accuracy and
timeliness could require significant resources. If those investments are
made, future discussions about the level of and growth in physician
spending will be better informed. In the meantime, the blunt tool of the
SGR has matched the specificity of the information available and may
allow policymakers to control spending without interfering in clinical
decision making.
More acceptable approaches to controlling
physician spending that balance benefi-
ciary access and federal budget realities
have yet to be realized.
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